M6: Cost sharing and the demand for healthcare
10 important questions on M6: Cost sharing and the demand for healthcare
Are ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard about the price or behavioural effect?
Ex-ante: behavioural effect
How can moral hazard impose a welfare loss? And draw a graph with this welfare loss.
The welfare loss from moral hazard might differ across types of care, why?
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What is ex-post moral hazard?
Relate to elasticity and demand:
with elastic demand, insurance increases quantity demanded
What is the policy relevance of moral hazard? So why is this relation important for policy makers?
Degree of insurance: What do I put in the package and what not? But, also what should be the level of coverage for medical treatment in the package? How should the cost sharing look like? 100% insurance or 90% and 10% out of pocket? Coinsurance? Etc..
The elasticity of medical spending with respect to its out-of-pocket price found in the RANDexperiment (-0.2) is not a universal constant like x, why?
Even under the assumption that the RAND-findings are completely valid, extrapolation of these findings is tricky, why?
Health Care system in the US is totally different from HC system in other countries. Effect/relationship between demand for health care and health care spending is also influenced by how the health plan is designed
Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) find that consumers respond to spot prices rather than the true expected end-of-year price. What are potential explanations?
What are the findings of Brot and Goldberg about cost-sharing and:
- the demand for health care
- - the demand for health care across a broad range of services
- - the demand for both low- and high-value care
- - motivate people to switch to cheaper providers?
- motivate people to substitute higher-cost procedures with lower cost-procedures?
- reduces the demand for health care
- reduces the demand for health care across a broad range of services
- reduces the demand for both lowand high-value care
- did not motivate people to switch to cheaper providers
- somewhat motivated people to substitute higher-cost procedures with lower cost-cost procedures
Moral hazard does not by definition impose a welfare loss. Why? (3x)
- Externalities
- Prevention
- Access to medical care
The question on the page originate from the summary of the following study material:
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