Social welfare functions and social prefernce ordering functions
8 important questions on Social welfare functions and social prefernce ordering functions
The multiplicative Social Welfare Function
Nash’s principle for selecting the fairest point on a contract curve
Application of Nash’s principle requires that negotiators are totally open and honest towards an adjudicator regarding their utility functions.
The additive Social Welfare Function
•Adding up amounts of money, goods, land, etc. usually makes more sense than multiplying them.
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Can individual utilities be interpersonally compared?
It is often assumed that individual utilities are not interpersonally comparable
Social preference ordering function
>1, …, >i, …, >n
one and exactly one ordering, which is the “social preference ordering” >SP
Relaxing the requirements of Arrow's theorim
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
This restriction is equivalent to forbidding quantitative preference information (and therewith forbidding the Borda count. One reason for wanting to exclude such quantitative preference information is that systems working with such quantitative information are (more) prone to strategic behaviour.
Implication of Arrow: the need for constitutional safeguards.
What is the “distributional issue”, according to Mueller?
It remains that the situation from which the decision process starts may be considered unjust, e.g. because of previous violations of “constitutional safeguards”.
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