Negotiating Humanitarian access
8 important questions on Negotiating Humanitarian access
Al-Shabaab’s core leadership hailed from several Somali clans. Yet despite internal clan-based and ideological rifts, the organisation maintained remarkable unity during the period under review.
During the period of Ethiopian occupation in Somalia from 2007 to 2009 popular anger toward Ethiopian interference exacerbated by the latter’s heavy and at times disproportionate use of violence.
- What happened to al-Shabaab as a result?
With territorial control came governance responsibilities. Al-Shabaab was quick to establish governance structures.
- What were al-Shabaab most important sources of income?
- An extensive system of taxation.
Most governorate administrators, including humanitarian officers, were centrally appointed, deliberately chosen for being non-local and frequently substituted.
- What does this mean for humanitarian agencies?
- It created major challenges for humanitarian agencies seeking to form durable relations through which to sustain or expand their access.
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Securing and sustaining access to al-Shabaab-controlled
areas during the period 2009-2013 were extremely challenging for numerous humanitarian organisations.
However, al-Shabaab’s treatment of NGOs varied.
The project under review was not immune to the group’s aggression but did not experience it to the degree or frequency of many other projects.
It is likely that the project would have experienced substantially more problems and may not have lasted as long as it did without the presence of three important factors.
- What are those three important factors?
- The programme existed before al-Shabab arrived.
- It offered a "product that was highly valued by the community.
- It had experienced senior national staff.
- Owing to frequent evacuations of international staff in the preceding years, the Somali staff corps was already accustomed to:
- Remote management.
Despite al-Shabaab’s general tolerance of the humanitarian organisation and its activities, the negotiation channel was always weak.
- How did this become clear?
- By 2011 decision-making both sides did not communicate directly.
- Negotiations took place solely between local al-Shabaab representatives – primarily the humanitarian officer – and the humanitarian organisation’s senior local staff.
The crucial question in Somalia was whether or not a sufficiently robust RM system could prevent the organisation from systematically crossing its red lines.
The organisation grappled with four main red-lines issues.
- Define those four red-lines issues:
- Declining medical quality.
- Staff protection.
- Impartiality.
- Resource diversion.
Resource diversion.
Ensuring that the organisation’s resources were directed solely toward the project’s medical humanitarian objectives. Broadly speaking this can occur in three ways.
- Define those three ways:
- Spin-off effects.
- Leakage.
- Direct transfers.
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