Social Insurance

19 important questions on Social Insurance

What are social insurance programs?

Government interventions in the provision of insurance against adverse events

When is a program means-tested?

Programs in which eligibility depends on the level of one's current income or assets

Insurance is valuable because it helps individuals insurance consumption across states of the world. What is consumption smoothing and what are states of the world?

Consumption smoothing: The translation of consumption from periods when consumtpion is high, and thus has low marginal utility, to periods when consumption is low, and thus has high marginal utility

States of the world: the set of outcomes that are possible in an uncertain future
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What is the expected utility model?

The weighted sum of utilities across states of the world, where the weights are the probabilities of each state occurring

When is a premium actuarially fair?

Insurance premium that is set equal to the insurer's expected payout

Why would the government provide insurance?

Information asymmetry can lead to a key market failure called adverse selection. Individuals may know more about their riskiness than do insurers

If low-risk people have a high enough risk premium, they will subsidize high risk people in a pooling equilibrium. What is the difference between a pooling and a seperating equilibrium?

Pooling: a market equilibrium in which all types of people buy full insurance, even though it is not fairly priced to all individuals

Separating: a market equilibirum in which different types of people buy different kinds of insurance products designed to reveil their true types

What is experience rating? How did it cause death spirals in the US?

Charging a price for insurance that is a function of realized outcomes.

  In 1995, Harvard stopped subsidizing its most generous plans, which were experience rated. Before, there was a pooling equilibrium. Health employees chose the cheap, generous plan.
After 1995, there was a separating equilibrum: health employees dropped the now expensive generous plan. The less health used much more medical care, the experience-rated premiums of the more generous plans increased substantially. By 1998, the most generous plan had gotten so expensive that it was not longer offered

Adverse selection leads to market failure since health people may not be able to buy insurance. The government can improve market efficiency by making insurance mandatory, but why is this unpopular?

It involves redistribution from the health to the sick

Give some reasons for government intervention in insurance markets, next to adverse selection

1. Externalities: vaccines have positive spillovers, car crashes negative ones

2. Administrative costs: Medicare has much lower administrative costs than private insurance

3. Redistribution: governments may want to redistribute from health to sick (simply luck if you're healthy?)

4. Paternalism: governments may feel that people would choose to buy too little insurance for themselves

The importance of social insurance smoothing depends on two factors. Which ones?

1. Predictability of the event: easier to self-insure against predictable events
2. Cost of the event: easier to self-insure against low-cost events

The cost of insurance is moral hazard. What is this?

Adverse actions taken by individuals or producers in response to insurance against adverse outcomes. Nothing emboldens sin so much as mercy

What determines moral hazard?

1 How easy it is to observe whether the adverse event has happened

2 How easy it is to change behavior in order to establish the adverse event

In examining the effects of social insurance, four types of moral hazard play a particularly important role. Name them.

1. Reduced precaution against entering the adverse state

2. Increased odds of entering the adverse state

3. Increased expenditures when in the adverse state

4. Supplier responses to insurance against the adverse state

Moral hazard is costly for two reasons. Name them

1. The adverse behavior encouraged by insurance lowers social efficiency because it reduces the provisions of socially efficient labour supply

2. When social insurance encourages adverse events, which raise the cost of the social insurance program, it increases taxes and lowers social efficiency even further

What is the optimal social insurance?

1. Optimal social insurance systems should partially, not completely,insure individuals against adverse events

2. The benefit of social insurance is the amount of consumption smoothing provided by social insurance programs

3. The cost of social insurance is the moral hazard caused by insuring against adverse events

What is the irony of asymmetric information?

It both motivates and undercuts the rationale for government intervention through social insurance

Which characteristics distinguish social insurance from public assistance?

1. participation is compulsory
2. contributions are compulsory
3. benefits only occur at certain events
4. eligibility regardless of income

Explain the moral hazard problem of insurance and how it can be solved

If the agent gets full insurance, the individual does not put any effort in preventing an accident: why would you care about preventing it if you get your money anyway?

Solution: offer only partial insurance. If a bad accident happens, you bear some of the costs of the accident. Thus, you have an incentive to decrease p(x) by putting in effort (x)

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