Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers' Compensation

9 important questions on Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers' Compensation

Appropriate time pattern of unemployment insurance balances three factors. Which ones?

Moral hazard: increases with length

Consumption smoothing: increases with length

Benefit targeting: increases with length

This graph shows Meyer's study (1989) how an increase in benefits affected unemployment durations. How did it?

Maximum weekly benefit increased from 350 to 400. Only high income workers saw a benefit increase (group H) workers with weekly earnings below 700 were unaffected (group L). Overall, 10%increase in benefits increases durations by about 8%.

Do longer durations represent an undesirable outcome? Give two different arguments, one using 'job match quality''. What do empirics say?

Yes: if UI subsidizes unproductive leisure

No: if UI is helping people find higher quality job matches 

job match quality: the marginal product associated with the match of a particular worker with a particular job 

empirics: wages do not increase with UI generosity, suggesting UI does not improve match quality
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Krueger (1990) studied a benefit increase in MN:

- every 10% increase in benefits generosity led to a 7% rise in the rate of reported injuries, and 17% longer durations

- the response of injury durations to benefits increases is much stronger for hart-to-verify injuries than for easier-to-verify injuries

- 'Monday sprain and strains'

What are general findings on DI, WC and UI?

1. generosity

Benefits should be highest for DI, lowest for WC, with UI in the middle

> but WC is most generous

2. targeting

Target UI benefits toward those who have been permanently laid off    
& pay higher benefits to those with less ambiguous disabilities

How would moral hazard be minimized in UI?

Worker self insurance. By making unemployed or injured workers pay for their income support out of their own savings accounts.
A UI payroll tax of 4% invested in such accounts could cover the costs of unemployment spells for virtually all workers.

What is another possibility to reform UI?

Reemployment earnings insurance:
1. self-insurance for unemployment. Savings, with government loans. Loan forgiveness for low-wage/long-term unemployed

2. wage insurance. If you take a lower-paying job, you get a transfer equal to 25% of the wage cut

3. Net result: lower moral hazard, redistribution to both low-wage workers and to workers suffering a large wage loss.

The duration of an insurance should balance three factors. Which ones?

Consumption smoothing (longer better)

Targeting (the longer the better)

Moral hazard (the shorter the better)

Why is there no perfect consumption smoothing in UI?

1) households save less
2) spouses are less likely to work

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